readme: caveats

Signed-off-by: Ramon Petgrave <ramon.petgrave64@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ramon Petgrave
2024-06-25 23:28:58 +00:00
parent 80b4cec23a
commit 368e43c418

View File

@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@
- [Verification for Google Cloud Build](#verification-for-google-cloud-build)
- [Artifacts](#artifacts-1)
- [Containers](#containers-1)
- [Verification Summary Attestations (VSA)](#verification-summary-attestations-vsa)
- [Caveats](#caveats)
- [Sigstore](#sigstore)
- [Subject Resource Descriptors](#subject-resource-descriptors)
- [Known Issues](#known-issues)
- [tuf: invalid key](#tuf-invalid-key)
- [panic: assignment to entry in nil map](#panic-assignment-to-entry-in-nil-map)
@@ -481,16 +485,12 @@ The verified in-toto statement may be written to stdout with the
Note that `--source-uri` supports GitHub repository URIs like `github.com/$OWNER/$REPO` when the build was enabled with a Cloud Build [GitHub trigger](https://cloud.google.com/build/docs/automating-builds/github/build-repos-from-github). Otherwise, the build provenance will contain the name of the Cloud Storage bucket used to host the source files, usually of the form `gs://[PROJECT_ID]_cloudbuild/source` (see [Running build](https://cloud.google.com/build/docs/running-builds/submit-build-via-cli-api#running_builds)). We recommend using GitHub triggers in order to preserve the source provenance and valiate that the source came from an expected, version-controlled repository. You _may_ match on the fully-qualified tar like `gs://[PROJECT_ID]_cloudbuild/source/1665165360.279777-955d1904741e4bbeb3461080299e929a.tgz`.
### Verification Summary Attestations (VSA)
## Verification Summary Attestations (VSA)
We have support for [verifying](https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.1/verification_summary#how-to-verify) VSAs.
Rather than passing in filepaths as arguments, we allow passing in mulitple `--subject-digest` cli options, to
accomodate subjects that are not simple-files.
This support does not work yet with VSAs wrapped in Sigstore bundles, only with simple DSSE envelopes.
With that, we allow the user to pass in the public key.
Note that if the DSSE Envelope `signatures` specifies a `keyid` that is not a unpadded base64 encoded sha256 hash the key, like `sha256:abc123...` (not a well-known identifier, e.g, `my-kms:prod-vsa-key`), then you must supply the `--public-key-id` cli option.
The verify-vsa command
@@ -536,6 +536,18 @@ For multiple subhects, use:
--subject-digest sha256:xyz456
```
### Caveats
#### Sigstore
This support does not work yet with VSAs wrapped in Sigstore bundles, only with simple DSSE envelopes.
With that, we allow the user to pass in the public key.
Note that if the DSSE Envelope `signatures` specifies a `keyid` that is not a unpadded base64 encoded sha256 hash the key, like `sha256:abc123...` (not a well-known identifier, e.g, `my-kms:prod-vsa-key`), then you must supply the `--public-key-id` cli option.
#### Subject Resource Descriptors
According to slsa.dev's [VSA schema](https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.1/verification_summary#schema), we only support the Subject's `Name` and `Digest`, not the full in_toto [Statement](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/in-toto/attestation/go/v1#Statement)'s [ResourceDescriptor](https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/blob/main/spec/v1/resource_descriptor.md).
## Known Issues
### tuf: invalid key