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added_docs
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fix_audit_
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23
docs/_kb/KHV052.md
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23
docs/_kb/KHV052.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
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---
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vid: KHV052
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title: Exposed Pods
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categories: [Information Disclosure]
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---
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# {{ page.vid }} - {{ page.title }}
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## Issue description
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An attacker could view sensitive information about pods that are bound to a Node using the exposed /pods endpoint
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This can be done either by accessing the readonly port (default 10255), or from the secure kubelet port (10250)
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## Remediation
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Ensure kubelet is protected using `--anonymous-auth=false` kubelet flag. Allow only legitimate users using `--client-ca-file` or `--authentication-token-webhook` kubelet flags. This is usually done by the installer or cloud provider.
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Disable the readonly port by using `--read-only-port=0` kubelet flag.
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## References
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- [Kubelet configuration](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/)
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- [Kubelet authentication/authorization](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-authentication-authorization/)
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@@ -35,10 +35,7 @@ class ExposedPodsHandler(Vulnerability, Event):
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def __init__(self, pods):
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Vulnerability.__init__(
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self,
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component=Kubelet,
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name="Exposed Pods",
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category=InformationDisclosure,
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self, component=Kubelet, name="Exposed Pods", category=InformationDisclosure, vid="KHV052"
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)
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self.pods = pods
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self.evidence = f"count: {len(self.pods)}"
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@@ -1139,11 +1136,16 @@ class ProveSystemLogs(ActiveHunter):
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f"{self.base_url}/" + KubeletHandlers.LOGS.value.format(path="audit/audit.log"),
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verify=False,
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timeout=config.network_timeout,
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).text
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logger.debug(f"Audit log of host {self.event.host}: {audit_logs[:10]}")
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# iterating over proctitles and converting them into readable strings
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proctitles = []
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for proctitle in re.findall(r"proctitle=(\w+)", audit_logs):
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proctitles.append(bytes.fromhex(proctitle).decode("utf-8").replace("\x00", " "))
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self.event.proctitles = proctitles
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self.event.evidence = f"audit log: {proctitles}"
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)
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# TODO: add more methods for proving system logs
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if audit_logs.status_code == requests.status_codes.codes.OK:
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logger.debug(f"Audit log of host {self.event.host}: {audit_logs.text[:10]}")
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# iterating over proctitles and converting them into readable strings
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proctitles = []
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for proctitle in re.findall(r"proctitle=(\w+)", audit_logs.text):
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proctitles.append(bytes.fromhex(proctitle).decode("utf-8").replace("\x00", " "))
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self.event.proctitles = proctitles
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self.event.evidence = f"audit log: {proctitles}"
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else:
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self.event.evidence = "Could not parse system logs"
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