[stable/falco] Update Falco to 0.16.0 (#15973)

Signed-off-by: Néstor Salceda <nestor.salceda@sysdig.com>

stable/falco/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -3,6 +3,13 @@
 This file documents all notable changes to Sysdig Falco Helm Chart. The release
 numbering uses [semantic versioning](http://semver.org).
 
+## v1.0.2
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+* Upgrade to Falco 0.16.0
+* Upgrade rules to Falco 0.16.0
+
 ## v1.0.1
 
 ### Minor Changes

stable/falco/Chart.yaml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 apiVersion: v1
 name: falco
-version: 1.0.1
-appVersion: 0.15.3
+version: 1.0.2
+appVersion: 0.16.0
 description: Falco
 keywords:
   - monitoring

stable/falco/README.md

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ The following table lists the configurable parameters of the Falco chart and the
 | ---                                             | ---                                                                                                                | ---                                                                                    |
 | `image.registry`                                | The image registry to pull from                                                                                    | `docker.io`                                                                            |
 | `image.repository`                              | The image repository to pull from                                                                                  | `falcosecurity/falco`                                                                  |
-| `image.tag`                                     | The image tag to pull                                                                                              | `0.15.3`                                                                               |
+| `image.tag`                                     | The image tag to pull                                                                                              | `0.16.0`                                                                               |
 | `image.pullPolicy`                              | The image pull policy                                                                                              | `IfNotPresent`                                                                         |
 | `cri.socket`                                    | The path of the CRI socket                                                                                         | `/run/containerd/containerd.sock`                                                      |
 | `docker.socket`                                 | The path of the Docker daemon socket                                                                               | `/var/run/docker.sock`                                                                 |

stable/falco/rules/falco_rules.yaml

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
 - macro: rename
   condition: evt.type in (rename, renameat)
 - macro: mkdir
-  condition: evt.type = mkdir
+  condition: evt.type in (mkdir, mkdirat)
 - macro: remove
   condition: evt.type in (rmdir, unlink, unlinkat)
 
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@
   items: [docker, dockerd, exe, docker-compose, docker-entrypoi, docker-runc-cur, docker-current, dockerd-current]
 
 - list: k8s_binaries
-  items: [hyperkube, skydns, kube2sky, exechealthz, weave-net, loopback, bridge, openshift-sdn]
+  items: [hyperkube, skydns, kube2sky, exechealthz, weave-net, loopback, bridge, openshift-sdn, openshift]
 
 - list: lxd_binaries
   items: [lxd, lxcfs]
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@
 # A canonical set of processes that run other programs with different
 # privileges or as a different user.
 - list: userexec_binaries
-  items: [sudo, su, suexec, critical-stack]
+  items: [sudo, su, suexec, critical-stack, dzdo]
 
 - list: known_setuid_binaries
   items: [
@@ -311,13 +311,17 @@
      (fd.ip != "0.0.0.0" and fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8") and
      (evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res = EINPROGRESS))
 
+# RFC1918 addresses were assigned for private network usage
+- list: rfc_1918_addresses
+  items: ['"10.0.0.0/8"', '"172.16.0.0/12"', '"192.168.0.0/16"']
+
 - macro: outbound
   condition: >
     (((evt.type = connect and evt.dir=<) or
       (evt.type in (sendto,sendmsg) and evt.dir=< and
        fd.l4proto != tcp and fd.connected=false and fd.name_changed=true)) and
      (fd.typechar = 4 or fd.typechar = 6) and
-     (fd.ip != "0.0.0.0" and fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8") and
+     (fd.ip != "0.0.0.0" and fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8" and not fd.snet in (rfc_1918_addresses)) and
      (evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res = EINPROGRESS))
 
 # Very similar to inbound/outbound, but combines the tests together
@@ -348,7 +352,7 @@
 - rule: Disallowed SSH Connection
   desc: Detect any new ssh connection to a host other than those in an allowed group of hosts
   condition: (inbound_outbound) and ssh_port and not allowed_ssh_hosts
-  output: Disallowed SSH Connection (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name user=%user.name)
+  output: Disallowed SSH Connection (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [network, mitre_remote_service]
 
@@ -379,7 +383,7 @@
     ((fd.sip in (allowed_outbound_destination_ipaddrs)) or
      (fd.snet in (allowed_outbound_destination_networks)) or
      (fd.sip.name in (allowed_outbound_destination_domains)))
-  output: Disallowed outbound connection destination (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name user=%user.name)
+  output: Disallowed outbound connection destination (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [network]
 
@@ -402,7 +406,7 @@
     ((fd.cip in (allowed_inbound_source_ipaddrs)) or
      (fd.cnet in (allowed_inbound_source_networks)) or
      (fd.cip.name in (allowed_inbound_source_domains)))
-  output: Disallowed inbound connection source (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name user=%user.name)
+  output: Disallowed inbound connection source (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [network]
 
@@ -440,7 +444,7 @@
      fd.directory in (shell_config_directories)) and
     not proc.name in (shell_binaries)
   output: >
-    a shell configuration file has been modified (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
+    a shell configuration file has been modified (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority:
     WARNING
   tag: [file, mitre_persistence]
@@ -462,7 +466,7 @@
      fd.directory in (shell_config_directories)) and
     (not proc.name in (shell_binaries))
   output: >
-    a shell configuration file was read by a non-shell program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
+    a shell configuration file was read by a non-shell program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority:
     WARNING
   tag: [file, mitre_discovery]
@@ -906,7 +910,7 @@
   condition: >
     open_write and access_repositories and not package_mgmt_procs
   output: >
-    Repository files get updated (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
+    Repository files get updated (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority:
     NOTICE
   tags: [filesystem, mitre_persistence]
@@ -921,7 +925,7 @@
     and not python_running_ms_oms
   output: >
     File below a known binary directory opened for writing (user=%user.name
-    command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2])
+    command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: ERROR
   tags: [filesystem, mitre_persistence]
 
@@ -979,7 +983,7 @@
     and not user_known_write_monitored_dir_conditions
   output: >
     File below a monitored directory opened for writing (user=%user.name
-    command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2])
+    command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: ERROR
   tags: [filesystem, mitre_persistence]
 
@@ -998,7 +1002,7 @@
      (not proc.name in (ssh_binaries)))
   output: >
     ssh-related file/directory read by non-ssh program (user=%user.name
-    command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline)
+    command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: ERROR
   tags: [filesystem, mitre_discovery]
 
@@ -1148,6 +1152,10 @@
 - macro: user_known_write_etc_conditions
   condition: proc.name=confd
 
+# This is a placeholder for user to extend the whitelist for write below etc rule
+- macro: user_known_write_below_etc_activities
+  condition: (never_true)
+
 - macro: write_etc_common
   condition: >
     etc_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write
@@ -1245,11 +1253,12 @@
     and not checkpoint_writing_state
     and not jboss_in_container_writing_passwd
     and not etcd_manager_updating_dns
+    and not user_known_write_below_etc_activities
 
 - rule: Write below etc
   desc: an attempt to write to any file below /etc
   condition: write_etc_common
-  output: "File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline file=%fd.name program=%proc.name gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4])"
+  output: "File below /etc opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline file=%fd.name program=%proc.name gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)"
   priority: ERROR
   tags: [filesystem, mitre_persistence]
 
@@ -1308,6 +1317,10 @@
 - macro: user_known_write_root_conditions
   condition: fd.name=/root/.bash_history
 
+# This is a placeholder for user to extend the whitelist for write below root rule
+- macro: user_known_write_below_root_activities
+  condition: (never_true)
+
 - rule: Write below root
   desc: an attempt to write to any file directly below / or /root
   condition: >
@@ -1329,7 +1342,8 @@
     and not rancher_writing_root
     and not known_root_conditions
     and not user_known_write_root_conditions
-  output: "File below / or /root opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname file=%fd.name program=%proc.name)"
+    and not user_known_write_below_root_activities
+  output: "File below / or /root opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname file=%fd.name program=%proc.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)"
   priority: ERROR
   tags: [filesystem, mitre_persistence]
 
@@ -1344,7 +1358,7 @@
   condition: sensitive_files and open_read and server_procs and not proc_is_new and proc.name!="sshd"
   output: >
     Sensitive file opened for reading by trusted program after startup (user=%user.name
-    command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2])
+    command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: WARNING
   tags: [filesystem, mitre_credential_access]
 
@@ -1394,7 +1408,7 @@
     and not runuser_reading_pam
   output: >
     Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (user=%user.name program=%proc.name
-    command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4])
+    command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: WARNING
   tags: [filesystem, mitre_credential_access, mitre_discovery]
 
@@ -1407,7 +1421,7 @@
     and not ansible_running_python
     and not python_running_chef
     and not exe_running_docker_save
-  output: "Rpm database opened for writing by a non-rpm program (command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline)"
+  output: "Rpm database opened for writing by a non-rpm program (command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name parent=%proc.pname pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)"
   priority: ERROR
   tags: [filesystem, software_mgmt, mitre_persistence]
 
@@ -1442,7 +1456,7 @@
     and not postgres_running_wal_e
   output: >
     Database-related program spawned process other than itself (user=%user.name
-    program=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)
+    program=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [process, database, mitre_execution]
 
@@ -1451,7 +1465,7 @@
   condition: (bin_dir_rename) and modify and not package_mgmt_procs and not exe_running_docker_save
   output: >
     File below known binary directory renamed/removed (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
-    pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline operation=%evt.type file=%fd.name %evt.args)
+    pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline operation=%evt.type file=%fd.name %evt.args container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: ERROR
   tags: [filesystem, mitre_persistence]
 
@@ -1460,7 +1474,7 @@
   condition: mkdir and bin_dir_mkdir and not package_mgmt_procs
   output: >
     Directory below known binary directory created (user=%user.name
-    command=%proc.cmdline directory=%evt.arg.path)
+    command=%proc.cmdline directory=%evt.arg.path container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: ERROR
   tags: [filesystem, mitre_persistence]
 
@@ -1470,6 +1484,18 @@
 - list: user_known_change_thread_namespace_binaries
   items: []
 
+- macro: user_known_change_thread_namespace_activities
+  condition: (never_true)
+
+- list: network_plugin_binaries
+  items: [aws-cni, azure-vnet]
+
+- macro: calico_node
+  condition: (container.image.repository endswith calico/node and proc.name=calico-node)
+
+- macro: weaveworks_scope
+  condition: (container.image.repository endswith weaveworks/scope and proc.name=scope)
+
 - rule: Change thread namespace
   desc: >
     an attempt to change a program/thread\'s namespace (commonly done
@@ -1477,7 +1503,7 @@
   condition: >
     evt.type = setns
     and not proc.name in (docker_binaries, k8s_binaries, lxd_binaries, sysdigcloud_binaries,
-                          sysdig, nsenter, calico, oci-umount)
+                          sysdig, nsenter, calico, oci-umount, network_plugin_binaries)
     and not proc.name in (user_known_change_thread_namespace_binaries)
     and not proc.name startswith "runc"
     and not proc.cmdline startswith "containerd"
@@ -1487,9 +1513,12 @@
     and not kubelet_running_loopback
     and not rancher_agent
     and not rancher_network_manager
+    and not calico_node
+    and not weaveworks_scope
+    and not user_known_change_thread_namespace_activities
   output: >
     Namespace change (setns) by unexpected program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
-    parent=%proc.pname %container.info)
+    parent=%proc.pname %container.info container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [process]
 
@@ -1635,35 +1664,38 @@
   output: >
     Shell spawned by untrusted binary (user=%user.name shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname
     cmdline=%proc.cmdline pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3]
-    aname[4]=%proc.aname[4] aname[5]=%proc.aname[5] aname[6]=%proc.aname[6] aname[7]=%proc.aname[7])
+    aname[4]=%proc.aname[4] aname[5]=%proc.aname[5] aname[6]=%proc.aname[6] aname[7]=%proc.aname[7] container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: DEBUG
   tags: [shell, mitre_execution]
 
 - macro: allowed_openshift_registry_root
   condition: >
     (container.image.repository startswith openshift3/ or
+     container.image.repository startswith registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ or
      container.image.repository startswith registry.access.redhat.com/openshift3/)
 
 # Source: https://docs.openshift.com/enterprise/3.2/install_config/install/disconnected_install.html
 - macro: openshift_image
   condition: >
     (allowed_openshift_registry_root and
-      (container.image.repository contains logging-deployment or
-       container.image.repository contains logging-elasticsearch or
-       container.image.repository contains logging-kibana or
-       container.image.repository contains logging-fluentd or
-       container.image.repository contains logging-auth-proxy or
-       container.image.repository contains metrics-deployer or
-       container.image.repository contains metrics-hawkular-metrics or
-       container.image.repository contains metrics-cassandra or
-       container.image.repository contains metrics-heapster or
-       container.image.repository contains ose-haproxy-router or
-       container.image.repository contains ose-deployer or
-       container.image.repository contains ose-sti-builder or
-       container.image.repository contains ose-docker-builder or
-       container.image.repository contains ose-pod or
-       container.image.repository contains ose-docker-registry or
-       container.image.repository contains image-inspector))
+      (container.image.repository endswith /logging-deployment or
+       container.image.repository endswith /logging-elasticsearch or
+       container.image.repository endswith /logging-kibana or
+       container.image.repository endswith /logging-fluentd or
+       container.image.repository endswith /logging-auth-proxy or
+       container.image.repository endswith /metrics-deployer or
+       container.image.repository endswith /metrics-hawkular-metrics or
+       container.image.repository endswith /metrics-cassandra or
+       container.image.repository endswith /metrics-heapster or
+       container.image.repository endswith /ose-haproxy-router or
+       container.image.repository endswith /ose-deployer or
+       container.image.repository endswith /ose-sti-builder or
+       container.image.repository endswith /ose-docker-builder or
+       container.image.repository endswith /ose-pod or
+       container.image.repository endswith /ose-node or
+       container.image.repository endswith /ose-docker-registry or
+       container.image.repository endswith /prometheus-node-exporter or
+       container.image.repository endswith /image-inspector))
 
 # These images are allowed both to run with --privileged and to mount
 # sensitive paths from the host filesystem.
@@ -1675,6 +1707,13 @@
 - list: trusted_images
   items: []
 
+# NOTE: This macro is only provided for backwards compatibility with
+# older local falco rules files that may have been appending to
+# trusted_images. To make customizations, it's better to add containers to
+# user_trusted_containers, user_privileged_containers or user_sensitive_mount_containers.
+- macro: trusted_containers
+  condition: (container.image.repository in (trusted_images))
+
 # Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file,
 # overwriting this macro) to specify additional containers that are
 # trusted and therefore allowed to run privileged *and* with sensitive
@@ -1687,10 +1726,10 @@
 # In this file, it just takes one of the images in trusted_containers
 # and repeats it.
 - macro: user_trusted_containers
-  condition: (container.image.repository=sysdig/agent)
+  condition: (container.image.repository endswith sysdig/agent)
 
 - list: sematext_images
-  items: [sematext/sematext-agent-docker, sematext/agent, sematext/logagent,
+  items: [docker.io/sematext/sematext-agent-docker, docker.io/sematext/agent, docker.io/sematext/logagent,
           registry.access.redhat.com/sematext/sematext-agent-docker,
           registry.access.redhat.com/sematext/agent,
           registry.access.redhat.com/sematext/logagent]
@@ -1698,10 +1737,10 @@
 # These container images are allowed to run with --privileged
 - list: falco_privileged_images
   items: [
-    sysdig/agent, sysdig/falco, sysdig/sysdig,
-    gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy, calico/node,
-    rook/toolbox, cloudnativelabs/kube-router, mesosphere/mesos-slave,
-    docker/ucp-agent, sematext_images
+    docker.io/sysdig/agent, docker.io/sysdig/falco, docker.io/sysdig/sysdig,
+    gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy, docker.io/calico/node,
+    docker.io/rook/toolbox, docker.io/cloudnativelabs/kube-router, docker.io/mesosphere/mesos-slave,
+    docker.io/docker/ucp-agent, sematext_images, k8s.gcr.io/kube-proxy
     ]
 
 - macro: falco_privileged_containers
@@ -1719,8 +1758,7 @@
 # In this file, it just takes one of the images in falco_privileged_images
 # and repeats it.
 - macro: user_privileged_containers
-  condition: (container.image.repository=sysdig/agent)
-
+  condition: (container.image.repository endswith sysdig/agent)
 
 - list: rancher_images
   items: [
@@ -1732,11 +1770,11 @@
 # host filesystem.
 - list: falco_sensitive_mount_images
   items: [
-    sysdig/agent, sysdig/falco, sysdig/sysdig,
+    docker.io/sysdig/agent, docker.io/sysdig/falco, docker.io/sysdig/sysdig,
     gcr.io/google_containers/hyperkube,
-    gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy, calico/node,
-    rook/toolbox, cloudnativelabs/kube-router, consul,
-    datadog/docker-dd-agent, datadog/agent, docker/ucp-agent, gliderlabs/logspout
+    gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy, docker.io/calico/node,
+    docker.io/rook/toolbox, docker.io/cloudnativelabs/kube-router, docker.io/consul,
+    docker.io/datadog/docker-dd-agent, docker.io/datadog/agent, docker.io/docker/ucp-agent, docker.io/gliderlabs/logspout
     ]
 
 - macro: falco_sensitive_mount_containers
@@ -1756,7 +1794,7 @@
 # In this file, it just takes one of the images in falco_sensitive_mount_images
 # and repeats it.
 - macro: user_sensitive_mount_containers
-  condition: (container.image.repository=sysdig/agent)
+  condition: (container.image.repository = docker.io/sysdig/agent)
 
 - rule: Launch Privileged Container
   desc: Detect the initial process started in a privileged container. Exceptions are made for known trusted images.
@@ -1794,7 +1832,7 @@
 # when we lose events and lose track of state.
 
 - macro: container_entrypoint
-  condition: (not proc.pname exists or proc.pname in (runc:[0:PARENT], runc:[1:CHILD], docker-runc, exe))
+  condition: (not proc.pname exists or proc.pname in (runc:[0:PARENT], runc:[1:CHILD], runc, docker-runc, exe))
 
 - rule: Launch Sensitive Mount Container
   desc: >
@@ -1837,7 +1875,7 @@
 - rule: System user interactive
   desc: an attempt to run interactive commands by a system (i.e. non-login) user
   condition: spawned_process and system_users and interactive
-  output: "System user ran an interactive command (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)"
+  output: "System user ran an interactive command (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)"
   priority: INFO
   tags: [users, mitre_remote_access_tools]
 
@@ -1849,7 +1887,7 @@
     and container_entrypoint
   output: >
     A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (user=%user.name %container.info
-    shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty)
+    shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.pname cmdline=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [container, shell, mitre_execution]
 
@@ -1923,7 +1961,7 @@
     and not login_doing_dns_lookup
   output: >
     Known system binary sent/received network traffic
-    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
+    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [network, mitre_exfiltration]
 
@@ -1949,7 +1987,7 @@
     proc.env icontains HTTP_PROXY
   output: >
     Program run with disallowed HTTP_PROXY environment variable
-    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline env=%proc.env parent=%proc.pname)
+    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline env=%proc.env parent=%proc.pname container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [host, users]
 
@@ -1972,7 +2010,7 @@
      and interpreted_procs)
   output: >
     Interpreted program received/listened for network traffic
-    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
+    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [network, mitre_exfiltration]
 
@@ -1983,7 +2021,7 @@
      and interpreted_procs)
   output: >
     Interpreted program performed outgoing network connection
-    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
+    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [network, mitre_exfiltration]
 
@@ -2024,7 +2062,7 @@
   condition: (inbound_outbound) and do_unexpected_udp_check and fd.l4proto=udp and not expected_udp_traffic
   output: >
     Unexpected UDP Traffic Seen
-    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name proto=%fd.l4proto evt=%evt.type %evt.args)
+    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name proto=%fd.l4proto evt=%evt.type %evt.args container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [network, mitre_exfiltration]
 
@@ -2084,7 +2122,7 @@
     and not user_known_non_sudo_setuid_conditions
   output: >
     Unexpected setuid call by non-sudo, non-root program (user=%user.name cur_uid=%user.uid parent=%proc.pname
-    command=%proc.cmdline uid=%evt.arg.uid)
+    command=%proc.cmdline uid=%evt.arg.uid container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [users, mitre_privilege_escalation]
 
@@ -2128,7 +2166,7 @@
     and not proc.name in (dev_creation_binaries)
     and not fd.name in (allowed_dev_files)
     and not fd.name startswith /dev/tty
-  output: "File created below /dev by untrusted program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)"
+  output: "File created below /dev by untrusted program (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)"
   priority: ERROR
   tags: [filesystem, mitre_persistence]
 
@@ -2189,7 +2227,7 @@
 - rule: Unexpected K8s NodePort Connection
   desc: Detect attempts to use K8s NodePorts from a container
   condition: (inbound_outbound) and fd.sport >= 30000 and fd.sport <= 32767 and container and not nodeport_containers
-  output: Unexpected K8s NodePort Connection (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name)
+  output: Unexpected K8s NodePort Connection (command=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [network, k8s, container, mitre_port_knocking]
 
@@ -2215,7 +2253,7 @@
   condition: >
     spawned_process and container and
     ((proc.name = "nc" and (proc.args contains "-e" or proc.args contains "-c")) or
-     (proc.name = "ncat" and (proc.args contains "--sh-exec" or proc.args contains "--exec" or proc.args contains "-e " 
+     (proc.name = "ncat" and (proc.args contains "--sh-exec" or proc.args contains "--exec" or proc.args contains "-e "
                               or proc.args contains "-c " or proc.args contains "--lua-exec"))
     )
   output: >
@@ -2299,12 +2337,19 @@
 - macro: access_log_files
   condition: (fd.directory in (log_directories) or fd.filename in (log_files))
 
+# a placeholder for whitelist log files that could be cleared. Recommend the macro as (fd.name startswith "/var/log/app1*")
+- macro: allowed_clear_log_files
+  condition: (never_true)
+
 - rule: Clear Log Activities
   desc: Detect clearing of critical log files
   condition: >
-    open_write and access_log_files and evt.arg.flags contains "O_TRUNC"
+    open_write and
+    access_log_files and
+    evt.arg.flags contains "O_TRUNC" and
+    not allowed_clear_log_files
   output: >
-    Log files were tampered (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
+    Log files were tampered (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority:
     WARNING
   tags: [file, mitre_defense_evasion]
@@ -2319,7 +2364,7 @@
   desc: Detect process running to clear bulk data from disk
   condition: spawned_process and clear_data_procs
   output: >
-    Bulk data has been removed from disk (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)
+    Bulk data has been removed from disk (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository)
   priority:
     WARNING
   tags: [process, mitre_persistence]
@@ -2387,7 +2432,6 @@
   priority: NOTICE
   tags: [network, process, mitre_lateral_movement, mitre_exfiltration]
 
-
 - rule: Create Symlink Over Sensitive Files
   desc: Detect symlink created over sensitive files
   condition: >

stable/falco/values.yaml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 image:
   registry: docker.io
   repository: falcosecurity/falco
-  tag: 0.15.3
+  tag: 0.16.0
   pullPolicy: IfNotPresent
 
 docker: