docs: additional test cases

This commit is contained in:
bsctl
2021-08-11 09:38:41 +02:00
committed by Dario Tranchitella
parent 894ea5016b
commit 7a698633d7
4 changed files with 193 additions and 3 deletions
@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ kubectl --kubeconfig alice delete networkpolicies capsule-oil-0
You should receive an error message denying the edit/delete request
```bash
Error from server (Forbidden): networkpolicies.networking.k8s.io "capsule-oil-0" is forbidden: User "oil" cannot delete resource "networkpolicies" in API group "networking.k8s.io" in the namespace "oil-production"
Error from server (Forbidden): networkpolicies.networking.k8s.io "capsule-oil-0" is forbidden:
User "oil" cannot delete resource "networkpolicies" in API group "networking.k8s.io" in the namespace "oil-production"
```
As tenant owner, you can create an additional networkpolicy inside the namespace
+118
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@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
# Block add capabilities
**Profile Applicability:** L1
**Type:** Behavioral Check
**Category:** Control Plane Isolation
**Description:** Control Linux capabilities.
**Rationale:** Linux allows defining fine-grained permissions using capabilities. With Kubernetes, it is possible to add capabilities for pods that escalate the level of kernel access and allow other potentially dangerous behaviors.
**Audit:**
As cluster admin, define a `PodSecurityPolicy` with `allowedCapabilities` and map the policy to a tenant:
```yaml
kubectl create -f - << EOF
apiVersion: policy/v1beta1
kind: PodSecurityPolicy
metadata:
name: tenant
spec:
privileged: false
# Required to prevent escalations to root.
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
# The default set of capabilities are implicitly allowed
# The empty set means that no additional capabilities may be added beyond the default set
allowedCapabilities: []
runAsUser:
rule: RunAsAny
seLinux:
rule: RunAsAny
supplementalGroups:
rule: RunAsAny
fsGroup:
rule: RunAsAny
EOF
```
> Note: make sure `PodSecurityPolicy` Admission Control is enabled on the APIs server: `--enable-admission-plugins=PodSecurityPolicy`
Then create a ClusterRole using or granting the said item
```yaml
kubectl create -f - << EOF
kind: ClusterRole
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
name: tenant:psp
rules:
- apiGroups: ['policy']
resources: ['podsecuritypolicies']
resourceNames: ['tenant']
verbs: ['use']
EOF
```
And assign it to the tenant
```yaml
kubectl apply -f - << EOF
apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta1
kind: Tenant
metadata:
name: oil
spec:
owners:
- kind: User
name: alice
additionalRoleBindings:
- clusterRoleName: tenant:psp
subjects:
- kind: "Group"
apiGroup: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
name: "system:authenticated"
EOF
./create-user.sh alice oil
```
As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant
```bash
kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production
kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production
```
As tenant owner, create a pod and see new capabilities cannot be added in the tenant namespaces
```yaml
kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: pod-with-settime-cap
namespace:
labels:
spec:
containers:
- name: busybox
image: busybox:latest
command: ["/bin/sleep", "3600"]
securityContext:
capabilities:
add:
- SYS_TIME
EOF
```
You should have the pod blocked by PodSecurityPolicy.
**Cleanup:**
As cluster admin, delete all the created resources
```bash
kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil
```
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
# Require always imagePullPolicy
**Profile Applicability:** L1
**Type:** Configuration Check
**Category:** Data Isolation
**Description:** Set the image pull policy to Always for tenant workloads.
**Rationale:** Tenants have to be assured that their private images can only be used by those who have the credentials to pull them.
**Audit:**
As cluster admin, create a tenant
```yaml
kubectl create -f - << EOF
apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta1
kind: Tenant
metadata:
name: oil
spec:
imagePullPolicies:
- Always
owners:
- kind: User
name: alice
EOF
./create-user.sh alice oil
```
As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant
```bash
kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production
kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production
```
As tenant owner, creates a pod in the tenant namespace having `imagePullPolicies=IfNotPresent`
```yaml
kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: nginx
namespace: oil-production
spec:
containers:
- name: nginx
image: nginx:latest
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
EOF
```
You should receive an error message denying the request:
```
Error from server
(ImagePullPolicy IfNotPresent for container nginx is forbidden, use one of the followings: Always): error when creating "STDIN": admission webhook "pods.capsule.clastix.io" denied the request:
ImagePullPolicy IfNotPresent for container nginx is forbidden, use one of the followings: Always
```
**Cleanup:**
As cluster admin, delete all the created resources
```bash
kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil
```
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@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ Actually, there's no yet a real standard for the multi-tenancy model in Kubernet
|[Block access to cluster resources](block-access-to-cluster-resources.md)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---|
|[Block access to multitenant resources](block-access-to-multitenant-resources.md)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---|
|[Block access to other tenant resources](block-access-to-other-tenant-resources.md)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|MTB draft|
|Block add capabilities|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---|
|Require always imagePullPolicy|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---|
|[Block add capabilities](block-add-capabilities.md)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---|
|[Require always imagePullPolicy](require-always-imagepullpolicy.md)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---|
|Require run as non-root user|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---|
|Block privileged containers|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---|
|Block privilege escalation|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---|