Files
Bose-SoundTouch/pkg/service/proxy/proxy.go
T
Tobias GesellchenandClaude Sonnet 4.6 e6bfcd1265 fix(security): remove credential-log bypass and sanitise header values in proxy
Two alerts at proxy.go:87:

- go/clear-text-logging (alert 294): the UnsafeLogCredentialHeaders escape
  hatch allowed credential-bearing headers (Authorization, Cookie, …) to
  reach log.Printf in plaintext when LOG_PROXY_CREDENTIALS=true. CodeQL
  traces the taint regardless of the conditional.

  Remove UnsafeLogCredentialHeaders entirely. The field, env-var init, and
  the 'No redaction' branch in formatHeaders are all deleted. Credentials
  are now always redacted unconditionally. Developers who need to inspect
  live credentials can use a tool like mitmproxy or Wireshark instead.

- go/log-injection (alert 295): header values assembled by formatHeaders
  were passed to log.Printf without newline stripping, allowing a
  malicious response to inject fake log lines.

  Apply sanitizeLog(val) to every non-redacted header value before it is
  added to the string builder. Redacted values stay as the literal string
  "[REDACTED]" which needs no further sanitisation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 10:34:13 +02:00

164 lines
4.5 KiB
Go

// Package proxy provides a logging reverse proxy used for speaker traffic debugging.
package proxy
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"net/http"
"net/http/httputil"
"os"
"strings"
)
// alwaysSensitiveHeaders are stripped from log output unconditionally — they
// carry credentials whose plaintext value should never appear in a log line
// regardless of how the LoggingProxy was constructed.
var alwaysSensitiveHeaders = []string{
"Authorization",
"Proxy-Authorization",
"Cookie",
"Set-Cookie",
"X-Api-Key",
"X-Bose-Token",
}
// sensitiveHeaders is kept for backwards compatibility with callers that
// reference it by name; it now mirrors alwaysSensitiveHeaders.
var sensitiveHeaders = alwaysSensitiveHeaders
// LoggingProxy wraps a ReverseProxy to provide instrumentation.
type LoggingProxy struct {
Proxy *httputil.ReverseProxy
Redact bool
LogBody bool
RecordEnabled bool
MaxBodySize int64
Recorder *Recorder
}
// NewLoggingProxy creates a lightweight logger for HTTP requests/responses.
func NewLoggingProxy(_ string, redact bool) *LoggingProxy {
// targetURL logic should be handled by the caller or we can parse it here
return &LoggingProxy{
Redact: redact,
LogBody: os.Getenv("LOG_PROXY_BODY") == "true",
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 10, // 10KB default limit for logging
}
}
// SetRecorder sets the recorder for the proxy.
func (lp *LoggingProxy) SetRecorder(r *Recorder) {
lp.Recorder = r
}
// LogRequest prints an abbreviated request with optional header/body redaction.
func (lp *LoggingProxy) LogRequest(r *http.Request) {
headers := formatHeaders(r.Header, lp.Redact)
bodyStr := "[HIDDEN]"
if lp.LogBody && shouldLogBody(r.Header.Get("Content-Type")) {
if r.Body != nil {
bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewBuffer(bodyBytes))
if int64(len(bodyBytes)) > lp.MaxBodySize {
bodyStr = string(bodyBytes[:lp.MaxBodySize]) + "... [TRUNCATED]"
} else {
bodyStr = string(bodyBytes)
}
} else {
bodyStr = "[EMPTY]"
}
}
log.Printf("[PROXY_REQ] %s %s\n Headers:\n%s\n Body: %s", r.Method, sanitizeLog(r.URL.String()), headers, sanitizeLog(bodyStr))
}
// LogResponse prints an abbreviated response with optional header/body redaction.
func (lp *LoggingProxy) LogResponse(r *http.Response) {
headers := formatHeaders(r.Header, lp.Redact)
bodyStr := "[HIDDEN]"
if lp.LogBody && shouldLogBody(r.Header.Get("Content-Type")) {
if r.Body != nil {
bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewBuffer(bodyBytes))
if int64(len(bodyBytes)) > lp.MaxBodySize {
bodyStr = string(bodyBytes[:lp.MaxBodySize]) + "... [TRUNCATED]"
} else {
bodyStr = string(bodyBytes)
}
} else {
bodyStr = "[EMPTY]"
}
}
log.Printf("[PROXY_RES] %d %s\n Headers:\n%s\n Body: %s", r.StatusCode, sanitizeLog(r.Request.URL.String()), headers, sanitizeLog(bodyStr))
if lp.Recorder != nil && lp.RecordEnabled {
_ = lp.Recorder.Record("upstream", r.Request, r)
}
}
func formatHeaders(h http.Header, redact bool) string {
var sb strings.Builder
// In Go, http.Header is a map[string][]string.
// Iterating over the map directly allows us to see the actual keys
// stored in the map, which might not be canonical if set directly.
for k, vv := range h {
val := strings.Join(vv, ", ")
// Credential-bearing headers are always redacted; the broader Redact
// toggle covers additional sensitive fields. Header values are passed
// through sanitizeLog to strip any embedded newlines before they reach
// the log sink (go/log-injection, alert 295).
switch {
case isAlwaysSensitive(k):
val = "[REDACTED]"
case redact && isSensitive(k):
val = "[REDACTED]"
default:
val = sanitizeLog(val)
}
fmt.Fprintf(&sb, " %s: %s\n", k, val)
}
return strings.TrimSuffix(sb.String(), "\n")
}
// isAlwaysSensitive returns true for credential-bearing headers that must
// never appear unredacted in logs regardless of caller configuration.
func isAlwaysSensitive(header string) bool {
for _, h := range alwaysSensitiveHeaders {
if strings.EqualFold(h, header) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func isSensitive(header string) bool {
for _, h := range sensitiveHeaders {
if strings.EqualFold(h, header) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func shouldLogBody(contentType string) bool {
contentType = strings.ToLower(contentType)
return strings.Contains(contentType, "xml") ||
strings.Contains(contentType, "json") ||
strings.Contains(contentType, "text") ||
contentType == ""
}