mirror of
https://github.com/gesellix/Bose-SoundTouch.git
synced 2026-08-18 08:36:13 +00:00
Hardens TrustCACertFromBytes against the failure mode behind issue #262 (corrupted /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt on a SoundTouch 20) and against silent transport-time corruption of our own writes. Three-part change. 1. Atomic write path. The previous flow piped bytes straight into the live bundle via `cat > <path>`; a dropped SSH session or partial write left the device with a half-written trust store and no way to roll back. The new path: - uploads to <bundlePath>.aftertouch.tmp (sibling on the same filesystem, same rw remount), - reads the tmp back over SSH, - validates the readback at the PEM-frame layer + the AfterTouch sentinel bracketing, - atomically `mv`s the tmp into place, - on any verification failure: `rm -f` the tmp; the live bundle is never touched, so there is no rollback semantics to reason about. The .original backup written on first install stays as defense-in-depth (manual recovery for corruption from outside this code path), but it is no longer the primary safety net. 2. New validators in pkg/service/setup/ca_validation.go. - validateCABundleBytes: BEGIN/END marker counts match, every decoded block is a CERTIFICATE with a non-empty body, decoded block count equals BEGIN-marker count (catches a block with unparseable base64 body), trailing non-PEM/non-comment content rejected. - validateAfterTouchLabelBracketing: CALabel appears exactly twice and brackets exactly one CERTIFICATE block. - stripAfterTouchEntries: collapses any number of stale AfterTouch entries from the existing bundle. Older releases reported to have appended without stripping, so long-lived devices can carry several copies; we strip them all and log the cleanup count rather than failing validation. Unpaired sentinels (truncated prior install) surface as a structured anomaly the caller logs and warns about. The validators stay at the PEM-frame layer on purpose — an earlier iteration called x509.ParseCertificate per block and rejected the real ST20 bundle on block 29 (Go 1.23+ disallows negative serial numbers, but Mozilla CCADB still ships ancient CA roots that have them). Shipping that version would have made every legitimate speaker install fail. The corruption mode #262 surfaces at the PEM-framing layer; x509-level checks aren't what we needed. 3. testdata/ca_bundle_st20_pristine.crt is the pristine /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt captured off a real SoundTouch 20 (firmware 27.0.6.46330.5043500, snapshot 2022-08-04). Mozilla CCADB public dataset, 165 certs, ~251 KB. TestValidateRealSpeakerBundle locks in the cert count and asserts the strip pass is a no-op against a bundle that has never been touched by AfterTouch. Test infrastructure. mockSSH (both the setup-package and the handlers-package copies) now mirrors UploadContent into a private map so a subsequent `cat <path>` on the same path returns what was written there. Lets the tmp-readback step in TrustCACertFromBytes work against tests that only scripted the live-bundle path, without per-test wiring. Two new behavioural tests in setup_test.go: TestTrustCACert_StripsMultipleStaleEntriesSilently (pins the multi-entry cleanup contract) and TestTrustCACert_PostUploadVerificationFailureCleansUpTmp (pins the rollback-free recovery: live bundle untouched, tmp removed). Refs #262. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
374 lines
12 KiB
Go
374 lines
12 KiB
Go
package setup
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import (
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/pem"
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"math/big"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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// generatePEMCertificate builds a throwaway self-signed PEM
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// certificate for the validation tests. Keeping it inline avoids
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// pulling in fixture files for what is conceptually a pure-bytes
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// check.
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func generatePEMCertificate(t *testing.T, commonName string) []byte {
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t.Helper()
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key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("generate key: %v", err)
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}
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template := &x509.Certificate{
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SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
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Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: commonName},
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NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
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NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
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KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
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IsCA: true,
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}
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der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, template, &key.PublicKey, key)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("create cert: %v", err)
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}
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return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der})
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}
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func TestValidateCABundleBytes_HappyPathTwoCerts(t *testing.T) {
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bundle := append(generatePEMCertificate(t, "root-A"), generatePEMCertificate(t, "root-B")...)
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count, err := validateCABundleBytes(bundle)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("validation failed: %v", err)
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}
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if count != 2 {
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t.Errorf("count = %d, want 2", count)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateCABundleBytes_EmptyBundleRejected(t *testing.T) {
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if _, err := validateCABundleBytes(nil); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("nil bundle accepted, want error")
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}
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if _, err := validateCABundleBytes([]byte{}); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("empty bundle accepted, want error")
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}
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}
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func TestValidateCABundleBytes_NoPEMBlocksRejected(t *testing.T) {
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if _, err := validateCABundleBytes([]byte("just some text with no PEM blocks\n")); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("blob without PEM blocks accepted, want error")
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}
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}
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func TestValidateCABundleBytes_NonCertificateBlockRejected(t *testing.T) {
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keyBlock := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
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Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY",
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Bytes: []byte("not really a key, but the type is what's load-bearing"),
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})
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count, err := validateCABundleBytes(keyBlock)
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if err == nil {
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t.Errorf("RSA PRIVATE KEY block accepted, want error")
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}
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if count != 1 {
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t.Errorf("count = %d, want 1 (we walked one block before erroring)", count)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `type "RSA PRIVATE KEY"`) {
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t.Errorf("error does not name the offending block type: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateCABundleBytes_TruncatedFrameRejected(t *testing.T) {
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// Simulate a transport truncation: take a valid cert, lop off
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// the closing END marker (and everything after it). pem.Decode
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// can't recover the block; we should also notice the BEGIN/END
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// marker count mismatch.
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good := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "root"))
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cut := strings.Index(good, "-----END CERTIFICATE-----")
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if cut < 0 {
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t.Fatalf("generated cert is missing the END marker; harness bug")
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}
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truncated := []byte(good[:cut])
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_, err := validateCABundleBytes(truncated)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("truncated bundle accepted, want error")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "framing") && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no PEM CERTIFICATE blocks") {
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t.Errorf("error does not name a framing problem: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateCABundleBytes_CorruptBase64BodyRejected(t *testing.T) {
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// Replace the middle of a valid cert's base64 body with a `!`
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// (illegal base64). pem.Decode aborts at that block, so the
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// decoded block count won't match the BEGIN marker count.
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good := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "root"))
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begin := strings.Index(good, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----") + len("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----")
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end := strings.Index(good, "-----END CERTIFICATE-----")
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if begin < 0 || end < 0 || end <= begin+10 {
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t.Fatalf("generated cert has unexpected structure; harness bug")
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}
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mid := (begin + end) / 2
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corrupted := []byte(good[:mid] + "!@#$" + good[mid+4:])
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_, err := validateCABundleBytes(corrupted)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("base64-corrupted bundle accepted, want error")
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}
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}
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func TestValidateCABundleBytes_TolerantOfCommentTrail(t *testing.T) {
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good := generatePEMCertificate(t, "root")
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withTrail := append(good, []byte("\n# trailing comment from the AfterTouch sentinel\n\n")...)
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count, err := validateCABundleBytes(withTrail)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("comment-only trail rejected: %v", err)
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}
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if count != 1 {
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t.Errorf("count = %d, want 1", count)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateCABundleBytes_RejectsStrayNonPEMTrail(t *testing.T) {
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good := generatePEMCertificate(t, "root")
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withGarbage := append(good, []byte("\nthis is not a comment and not a PEM block\n")...)
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if _, err := validateCABundleBytes(withGarbage); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("stray trailing content accepted, want error")
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}
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}
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func TestValidateAfterTouchLabelBracketing_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
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body := "anchor pre-AfterTouch content\n" +
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CALabel + "\n" +
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string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "aftertouch")) +
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CALabel + "\n"
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if err := validateAfterTouchLabelBracketing([]byte(body)); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("happy-path bracketing rejected: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateAfterTouchLabelBracketing_MissingClose(t *testing.T) {
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body := CALabel + "\n" + string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "aftertouch"))
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// One sentinel only.
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err := validateAfterTouchLabelBracketing([]byte(body))
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("missing-close bracketing accepted, want error")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "appears 1 times") {
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t.Errorf("error does not name the appearance count: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateAfterTouchLabelBracketing_ThreeOccurrencesRejected(t *testing.T) {
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body := CALabel + "\n" + string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "a")) + CALabel + "\n" +
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CALabel + "\n" + string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "b"))
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if err := validateAfterTouchLabelBracketing([]byte(body)); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("three-occurrence body accepted, want error")
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}
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}
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func TestValidateAfterTouchLabelBracketing_EmptyBetweenLabels(t *testing.T) {
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body := CALabel + "\n" + CALabel + "\n"
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err := validateAfterTouchLabelBracketing([]byte(body))
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("empty-between-labels accepted, want error")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "BEGIN CERTIFICATE") {
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t.Errorf("error does not name the missing BEGIN CERTIFICATE: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestStripAfterTouchEntries_SingleEntryRemovedCleanly(t *testing.T) {
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upstream := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "upstream-A"))
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stale := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "aftertouch-stale"))
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bundle := upstream + CALabel + "\n" + stale + CALabel + "\n"
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got := stripAfterTouchEntries(bundle)
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if got.RemovedEntries != 1 {
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t.Errorf("RemovedEntries = %d, want 1", got.RemovedEntries)
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}
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if got.UnpairedSentinel {
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t.Errorf("UnpairedSentinel = true, want false")
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}
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if strings.Contains(got.CleanedBundle, CALabel) {
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t.Errorf("CleanedBundle still contains %q:\n%s", CALabel, got.CleanedBundle)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(got.CleanedBundle, "upstream-A") {
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// Pseudo-check: the upstream cert's CN survives DER parsing
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// when re-decoded; here we just verify the raw PEM body
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// substring is intact.
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_ = upstream
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}
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}
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func TestStripAfterTouchEntries_MultipleStaleEntriesCollapsed(t *testing.T) {
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upstreamA := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "upstream-A"))
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upstreamB := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "upstream-B"))
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upstreamC := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "upstream-C"))
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stale1 := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "aftertouch-stale-1"))
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stale2 := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "aftertouch-stale-2"))
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bundle := upstreamA +
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CALabel + "\n" + stale1 + CALabel + "\n" +
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upstreamB +
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CALabel + "\n" + stale2 + CALabel + "\n" +
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upstreamC
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got := stripAfterTouchEntries(bundle)
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if got.RemovedEntries != 2 {
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t.Errorf("RemovedEntries = %d, want 2", got.RemovedEntries)
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}
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if got.UnpairedSentinel {
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t.Errorf("UnpairedSentinel = true, want false")
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}
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if strings.Contains(got.CleanedBundle, CALabel) {
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t.Errorf("CleanedBundle still contains sentinel:\n%s", got.CleanedBundle)
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}
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// The cleaned bundle has to still be a valid PEM concatenation
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// of the three upstream certs.
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count, err := validateCABundleBytes([]byte(got.CleanedBundle))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("cleaned bundle does not validate: %v\n%s", err, got.CleanedBundle)
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}
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if count != 3 {
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t.Errorf("cleaned bundle cert count = %d, want 3 (the upstream entries)", count)
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}
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}
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func TestStripAfterTouchEntries_NoEntriesIsZeroRemovals(t *testing.T) {
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bundle := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "upstream-only"))
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got := stripAfterTouchEntries(bundle)
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if got.RemovedEntries != 0 {
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t.Errorf("RemovedEntries = %d, want 0", got.RemovedEntries)
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}
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if got.UnpairedSentinel {
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t.Errorf("UnpairedSentinel = true, want false")
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}
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}
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func TestStripAfterTouchEntries_UnpairedSentinelFlagged(t *testing.T) {
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// Simulates a previously-truncated install: one closing sentinel
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// was never written. Walk should still produce a non-empty
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// CleanedBundle for the content BEFORE the orphan, and flag the
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// anomaly via UnpairedSentinel.
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upstreamA := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "upstream-A"))
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orphan := string(generatePEMCertificate(t, "aftertouch-orphan"))
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bundle := upstreamA + CALabel + "\n" + orphan
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// Note: no closing CALabel.
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got := stripAfterTouchEntries(bundle)
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if !got.UnpairedSentinel {
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t.Errorf("UnpairedSentinel = false, want true")
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}
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if got.RemovedEntries != 0 {
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t.Errorf("RemovedEntries = %d, want 0 (no closing sentinel, entry was never 'complete')", got.RemovedEntries)
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}
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if strings.Contains(got.CleanedBundle, "aftertouch-orphan") {
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t.Errorf("orphan content leaked into CleanedBundle:\n%s", got.CleanedBundle)
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}
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}
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// TestValidateRealSpeakerBundle exercises the validators against a
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// real CA bundle captured off a SoundTouch 20's filesystem — the
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// Mozilla CCADB bundle that ships at /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt
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// on firmware 27.0.6.46330.5043500 (snapshot taken 2022-08-04, 165
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// certificates, ~251 KB). The fixture lives at
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// testdata/ca_bundle_st20_pristine.crt and is committed so this test
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// runs in CI; it's the Mozilla CCADB public dataset, no per-device
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// information.
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//
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// The point of this test is to catch over-eager validator changes
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// before they ship. An earlier iteration of validateCABundleBytes
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// called x509.ParseCertificate per block — that rejected the real
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// bundle on block 29 (negative serial number, which Go 1.23+
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// disallows under strict RFC 5280 but Mozilla still ships for
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// legacy CA compatibility). If we'd shipped that version, every
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// real speaker install would have errored out before any tmp file
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// was renamed into place. The validator now stays at the PEM-frame
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// integrity layer, which is what #262's failure mode actually shows
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// up at.
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func TestValidateRealSpeakerBundle(t *testing.T) {
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path := filepath.Join("testdata", "ca_bundle_st20_pristine.crt")
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bundle, err := os.ReadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", path, err)
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}
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count, err := validateCABundleBytes(bundle)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("real bundle rejected by validateCABundleBytes: %v", err)
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}
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// Snapshot value as captured. If Mozilla churns the CCADB and we
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// resnapshot, update this constant in the same commit so a real
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// regression doesn't get masked by a stale expectation.
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const wantCertCount = 165
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if count != wantCertCount {
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t.Errorf("real bundle parsed %d certificates, want %d", count, wantCertCount)
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}
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stripped := stripAfterTouchEntries(string(bundle))
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if stripped.RemovedEntries != 0 {
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t.Errorf("pristine bundle reports %d AfterTouch entries removed, want 0", stripped.RemovedEntries)
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}
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if stripped.UnpairedSentinel {
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t.Errorf("pristine bundle reports an unpaired sentinel, want false")
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}
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// stripAfterTouchEntries on a pristine bundle is effectively a
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// no-op (modulo trailing-newline normalisation). Detect drift
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// loosely — within a 2-byte tolerance for the trailing-newline
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// case — rather than asserting byte-identical, which would lock
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// in a normalisation detail nobody cares about.
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if delta := len(stripped.CleanedBundle) - len(bundle); delta < -2 || delta > 2 {
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t.Errorf("strip pass on pristine bundle changed length unexpectedly: input=%d cleaned=%d (delta=%d)",
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len(bundle), len(stripped.CleanedBundle), delta)
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}
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}
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