# Multi-Tenancy Benchmark The [Multi-Tenancy Benchmark](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/multi-tenancy) is a _WG_ (Working Group) committed to achieving multi-tenancy in Kubernetes. The _Benchmarks_ are guidelines that validate if a Kubernetes cluster is properly configured for multi-tenancy. **Capsule** is an open source multi-tenancy operator, we decided to meet the requirements of _MTB_. although at the time of writing, it's in development and not ready for usage. Strictly speaking, we do not claim official conformance to _MTB_, but just to adhere to the multi-tenancy requirements and best practices promoted by _MTB_. |MTB Benchmark |MTB Profile|Capsule Version|Conformance|Notes | |--------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|-------| |[Block access to cluster resources](#block-access-to-cluster-resources)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Block access to multitenant resources](#block-access-to-multitenant-resources)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Block access to other tenant resources](#block-access-to-other-tenant-resources)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|MTB draft| |[Block add capabilities](#block-add-capabilities)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Require always imagePullPolicy](#require-always-imagepullpolicy)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Require run as non-root user](#require-run-as-non-root-user)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Block privileged containers](#block-privileged-containers)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Block privilege escalation](#block-privilege-escalation)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Configure namespace resource quotas](#configure-namespace-resource-quotas)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Block modification of resource quotas](#block-modification-of-resource-quotas)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Configure namespace object limits](#configure-namespace-object-limits)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Block use of host path volumes](#block-use-of-host-path-volumes)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Block use of host networking and ports](#block-use-of-host-networking-and-ports)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Block use of host PID](#block-use-of-host-pid)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Block use of host IPC](#block-use-of-host-ipc)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Block use of NodePort services](#block-use-of-nodeport-services)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Require PersistentVolumeClaim for storage](#require-persistentvolumeclaim-for-storage)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|MTB draft| |[Require PV reclaim policy of delete](#require-pv-reclaim-policy-of-delete)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|MTB draft| |[Block use of existing PVs](#block-use-of-existing-pvs)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|MTB draft| |[Block network access across tenant namespaces](#block-network-access-across-tenant-namespaces)|L1|v0.1.0|✓|MTB draft| |[Allow self-service management of Network Policies](#allow-self-service-management-of-network-policies)|L2|v0.1.0|✓|---| |[Allow self-service management of Roles](#allow-self-service-management-of-roles)|L2|v0.1.0|✓|MTB draft| |[Allow self-service management of Role Bindings](#allow-self-service-management-of-role-bindings)|L2|v0.1.0|✓|MTB draft| ## Allow self-service management of Network Policies **Profile Applicability:** L2 **Type:** Behavioral **Category:** Self-Service Operations **Description:** Tenants should be able to perform self-service operations by creating their own network policies in their namespaces. **Rationale:** Enables self-service management of network-policies. **Audit:** As cluster admin, create a tenant ```yaml kubectl create -f - < 7m5s ``` As a tenant, checks for permissions to manage networkpolicy for each verb ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i get networkpolicies kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i create networkpolicies kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i update networkpolicies kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i patch networkpolicies kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i delete networkpolicies kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i deletecollection networkpolicies ``` Each command must return 'yes' **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil ``` ## Allow self-service management of Role Bindings **Profile Applicability:** L2 **Type:** Behavioral **Category:** Self-Service Operations **Description:** Tenants should be able to perform self-service operations by creating their rolebindings in their namespaces. **Rationale:** Enables self-service management of roles. **Audit:** As cluster admin, create a tenant ```yaml kubectl create -f - < ``` Each command must return `no` **Exception:** It should, but it does not: ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i create selfsubjectaccessreviews yes kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i create selfsubjectrulesreviews yes kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i create namespaces yes ``` Any kubernetes user can create `SelfSubjectAccessReview` and `SelfSubjectRulesReviews` to checks whether he/she can act. First, two exceptions are not an issue. ```bash kubectl --anyuser auth can-i --list Resources Non-Resource URLs Resource Names Verbs selfsubjectaccessreviews.authorization.k8s.io [] [] [create] selfsubjectrulesreviews.authorization.k8s.io [] [] [create] [/api/*] [] [get] [/api] [] [get] [/apis/*] [] [get] [/apis] [] [get] [/healthz] [] [get] [/healthz] [] [get] [/livez] [] [get] [/livez] [] [get] [/openapi/*] [] [get] [/openapi] [] [get] [/readyz] [] [get] [/readyz] [] [get] [/version/] [] [get] [/version/] [] [get] [/version] [] [get] [/version] [] [get] ``` To enable namespace self-service provisioning, Capsule intentionally gives permissions to create namespaces to all users belonging to the Capsule group: ```bash kubectl describe clusterrolebindings capsule-namespace-provisioner Name: capsule-namespace-provisioner Labels: Annotations: Role: Kind: ClusterRole Name: capsule-namespace-provisioner Subjects: Kind Name Namespace ---- ---- --------- Group capsule.clastix.io kubectl describe clusterrole capsule-namespace-provisioner Name: capsule-namespace-provisioner Labels: Annotations: PolicyRule: Resources Non-Resource URLs Resource Names Verbs --------- ----------------- -------------- ----- namespaces [] [] [create] ``` Capsule controls self-service namespace creation by limiting the number of namespaces the user can create by the `tenant.spec.namespaceQuota option`. **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil ``` ## Block access to multitenant resources **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Behavioral **Category:** Tenant Isolation **Description:** Each tenant namespace may contain resources set up by the cluster administrator for multi-tenancy, such as role bindings, and network policies. Tenants should not be allowed to modify the namespaced resources created by the cluster administrator for multi-tenancy. However, for some resources such as network policies, tenants can configure additional instances of the resource for their workloads. **Rationale:** Tenants can escalate privileges and impact other tenants if they can delete or modify required multi-tenancy resources such as namespace resource quotas or default network policy. **Audit:** As cluster admin, create a tenant ```yaml kubectl create -f - < 7m5s capsule-oil-1 7m5s ``` As tenant owner try to modify or delete one of the networkpolicies ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice delete networkpolicies capsule-oil-0 ``` You should receive an error message denying the edit/delete request ```bash Error from server (Forbidden): networkpolicies.networking.k8s.io "capsule-oil-0" is forbidden: User "oil" cannot delete resource "networkpolicies" in API group "networking.k8s.io" in the namespace "oil-production" ``` As tenant owner, you can create an additional networkpolicy inside the namespace ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: hijacking namespace: oil-production spec: egress: - to: - ipBlock: cidr: 0.0.0.0/0 podSelector: {} policyTypes: - Egress EOF ``` However, due to the additive nature of networkpolicies, the `DENY ALL` policy set by the cluster admin, prevents hijacking. As tenant owner list RBAC permissions set by Capsule ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice get rolebindings NAME ROLE AGE capsule-oil-0-admin ClusterRole/admin 11h capsule-oil-1-capsule-namespace-deleter ClusterRole/capsule-namespace-deleter 11h ``` As tenant owner, try to change/delete the rolebinding to escalate permissions ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice edit/delete rolebinding capsule-oil-0-admin ``` The rolebinding is immediately recreated by Capsule: ``` kubectl --kubeconfig alice get rolebindings NAME ROLE AGE capsule-oil-0-admin ClusterRole/admin 2s capsule-oil-1-capsule-namespace-deleter ClusterRole/capsule-namespace-deleter 11h ``` However, the tenant owner can create and assign permissions inside the namespace she owns ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: RoleBinding metadata: labels: name: oil-robot:admin namespace: oil-production roleRef: apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: ClusterRole name: admin subjects: - kind: ServiceAccount name: default namespace: oil-production EOF ``` **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil ``` ## Block access to other tenant resources **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Behavioral **Category:** Tenant Isolation **Description:** Each tenant has its own set of resources, such as namespaces, service accounts, secrets, pods, services, etc. Tenants should not be allowed to access each other's resources. **Rationale:** Tenant's resources must be not accessible by other tenants. **Audit:** As cluster admin, create a couple of tenants ```yaml kubectl create -f - < Note: make sure `PodSecurityPolicy` Admission Control is enabled on the APIs server: `--enable-admission-plugins=PodSecurityPolicy` Then create a ClusterRole using or granting the said item ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF kind: ClusterRole apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: tenant:psp rules: - apiGroups: ['policy'] resources: ['podsecuritypolicies'] resourceNames: ['tenant'] verbs: ['use'] EOF ``` And assign it to the tenant ```yaml kubectl apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil namespace: oil-production spec: owners: - kind: User name: alice additionalRoleBindings: - clusterRoleName: tenant:psp subjects: - kind: "Group" apiGroup: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" name: "system:authenticated" EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production ``` As tenant owner, create a pod and see new capabilities cannot be added in the tenant namespaces ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: pod-with-settime-cap namespace: labels: spec: containers: - name: busybox image: busybox:latest command: ["/bin/sleep", "3600"] securityContext: capabilities: add: - SYS_TIME EOF ``` You must have the pod blocked by PodSecurityPolicy. **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete PodSecurityPolicy tenant kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete ClusterRole tenant:psp ``` ## Block modification of resource quotas **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Behavioral Check **Category:** Tenant Isolation **Description:** Tenants should not be able to modify the resource quotas defined in their namespaces **Rationale:** Resource quotas must be configured for isolation and fairness between tenants. Tenants should not be able to modify existing resource quotas as they may exhaust cluster resources and impact other tenants. **Audit:** As cluster admin, create a tenant ```yaml kubectl create -f - < Note: make sure `PodSecurityPolicy` Admission Control is enabled on the APIs server: `--enable-admission-plugins=PodSecurityPolicy` Then create a ClusterRole using or granting the said item ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF kind: ClusterRole apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: tenant:psp rules: - apiGroups: ['policy'] resources: ['podsecuritypolicies'] resourceNames: ['tenant'] verbs: ['use'] EOF ``` And assign it to the tenant ```yaml kubectl apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil spec: owners: - kind: User name: alice additionalRoleBindings: - clusterRoleName: tenant:psp subjects: - kind: "Group" apiGroup: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" name: "system:authenticated" EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production ``` As tenant owner, create a pod or container that sets `allowPrivilegeEscalation=true` in its `securityContext`. ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: pod-priviliged-mode namespace: oil-production labels: spec: containers: - name: busybox image: busybox:latest command: ["/bin/sleep", "3600"] securityContext: allowPrivilegeEscalation: true EOF ``` You must have the pod blocked by `PodSecurityPolicy`. **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete PodSecurityPolicy tenant kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete ClusterRole tenant:psp ``` ## Block privileged containers **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Behavioral Check **Category:** Control Plane Isolation **Description:** Control container permissions. **Rationale:** By default a container is not allowed to access any devices on the host, but a “privileged” container can access all devices on the host. A process within a privileged container can also get unrestricted host access. Hence, tenants should not be allowed to run privileged containers. **Audit:** As cluster admin, define a `PodSecurityPolicy` that sets `privileged=false` and map the policy to a tenant: ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy metadata: name: tenant spec: privileged: false # Required to prevent escalations to root. allowPrivilegeEscalation: false runAsUser: rule: RunAsAny seLinux: rule: RunAsAny supplementalGroups: rule: RunAsAny fsGroup: rule: RunAsAny EOF ``` > Note: make sure `PodSecurityPolicy` Admission Control is enabled on the APIs server: `--enable-admission-plugins=PodSecurityPolicy` Then create a ClusterRole using or granting the said item ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF kind: ClusterRole apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: tenant:psp rules: - apiGroups: ['policy'] resources: ['podsecuritypolicies'] resourceNames: ['tenant'] verbs: ['use'] EOF ``` And assign it to the tenant ```yaml kubectl apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil namespace: oil-production spec: owners: - kind: User name: alice additionalRoleBindings: - clusterRoleName: tenant:psp subjects: - kind: "Group" apiGroup: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" name: "system:authenticated" EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production ``` As tenant owner, create a pod or container that sets privileges in its `securityContext`. ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: pod-priviliged-mode namespace: labels: spec: containers: - name: busybox image: busybox:latest command: ["/bin/sleep", "3600"] securityContext: privileged: true EOF ``` You must have the pod blocked by `PodSecurityPolicy`. **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete PodSecurityPolicy tenant kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete ClusterRole tenant:psp ``` ## Block use of existing PVs **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Configuration Check **Category:** Data Isolation **Description:** Avoid a tenant to mount existing volumes`. **Rationale:** Tenants have to be assured that their Persistent Volumes cannot be reclaimed by other tenants. **Audit:** As cluster admin, create a tenant ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil spec: owners: - kind: User name: alice EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, check if you can access the persistent volumes ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i get persistentvolumes kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i list persistentvolumes kubectl --kubeconfig alice auth can-i watch persistentvolumes ``` You must receive for all the requests 'no'. ## Block use of host IPC **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Behavioral Check **Category:** Host Isolation **Description:** Tenants should not be allowed to share the host's inter-process communication (IPC) namespace. **Rationale:** The `hostIPC` setting allows pods to share the host's inter-process communication (IPC) namespace allowing potential access to host processes or processes belonging to other tenants. **Audit:** As cluster admin, define a `PodSecurityPolicy` that restricts `hostIPC` usage and map the policy to a tenant: ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy metadata: name: tenant spec: privileged: false # Required to prevent escalations to root. allowPrivilegeEscalation: false hostIPC: false runAsUser: rule: RunAsAny seLinux: rule: RunAsAny supplementalGroups: rule: RunAsAny fsGroup: rule: RunAsAny EOF ``` > Note: make sure `PodSecurityPolicy` Admission Control is enabled on the APIs server: `--enable-admission-plugins=PodSecurityPolicy` Then create a ClusterRole using or granting the said item ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF kind: ClusterRole apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: tenant:psp rules: - apiGroups: ['policy'] resources: ['podsecuritypolicies'] resourceNames: ['tenant'] verbs: ['use'] EOF ``` And assign it to the tenant ```yaml kubectl apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil namespace: oil-production spec: owners: - kind: User name: alice additionalRoleBindings: - clusterRoleName: tenant:psp subjects: - kind: "Group" apiGroup: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" name: "system:authenticated" EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production ``` As tenant owner, create a pod mounting the host IPC namespace. ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: pod-with-host-ipc namespace: oil-production spec: hostIPC: true containers: - name: busybox image: busybox:latest command: ["/bin/sleep", "3600"] EOF ``` You must have the pod blocked by `PodSecurityPolicy`. **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete PodSecurityPolicy tenant kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete ClusterRole tenant:psp ``` ## Block use of host networking and ports **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Behavioral Check **Category:** Host Isolation **Description:** Tenants should not be allowed to use host networking and host ports for their workloads. **Rationale:** Using `hostPort` and `hostNetwork` allows tenants workloads to share the host networking stack allowing potential snooping of network traffic across application pods. **Audit:** As cluster admin, define a `PodSecurityPolicy` that restricts `hostPort` and `hostNetwork` and map the policy to a tenant: ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy metadata: name: tenant spec: privileged: false # Required to prevent escalations to root. allowPrivilegeEscalation: false hostNetwork: false hostPorts: [] # empty means no allowed host ports runAsUser: rule: RunAsAny seLinux: rule: RunAsAny supplementalGroups: rule: RunAsAny fsGroup: rule: RunAsAny EOF ``` > Note: make sure `PodSecurityPolicy` Admission Control is enabled on the APIs server: `--enable-admission-plugins=PodSecurityPolicy` Then create a ClusterRole using or granting the said item ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF kind: ClusterRole apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: tenant:psp rules: - apiGroups: ['policy'] resources: ['podsecuritypolicies'] resourceNames: ['tenant'] verbs: ['use'] EOF ``` And assign it to the tenant ```yaml kubectl apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil namespace: oil-production spec: owners: - kind: User name: alice additionalRoleBindings: - clusterRoleName: tenant:psp subjects: - kind: "Group" apiGroup: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" name: "system:authenticated" EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production ``` As tenant owner, create a pod using `hostNetwork` ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: pod-with-hostnetwork namespace: oil-production spec: hostNetwork: true containers: - name: nginx image: nginx:latest ports: - containerPort: 80 EOF ``` As tenant owner, create a pod defining a container using `hostPort` ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: pod-with-hostport namespace: oil-production spec: containers: - name: nginx image: nginx:latest ports: - containerPort: 80 hostPort: 9090 EOF ``` In both the cases above, you must have the pod blocked by `PodSecurityPolicy`. **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete PodSecurityPolicy tenant kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete ClusterRole tenant:psp ``` ## Block use of host path volumes **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Behavioral Check **Category:** Host Protection **Description:** Tenants should not be able to mount host volumes and directories. **Rationale:** The use of host volumes and directories can be used to access shared data or escalate privileges and also creates a tight coupling between a tenant workload and a host. **Audit:** As cluster admin, define a `PodSecurityPolicy` that restricts `hostPath` volumes and map the policy to a tenant: ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy metadata: name: tenant spec: privileged: false # Required to prevent escalations to root. allowPrivilegeEscalation: false volumes: # hostPath is not permitted - 'configMap' - 'emptyDir' - 'projected' - 'secret' - 'downwardAPI' - 'persistentVolumeClaim' runAsUser: rule: RunAsAny seLinux: rule: RunAsAny supplementalGroups: rule: RunAsAny fsGroup: rule: RunAsAny EOF ``` > Note: make sure `PodSecurityPolicy` Admission Control is enabled on the APIs server: `--enable-admission-plugins=PodSecurityPolicy` Then create a ClusterRole using or granting the said item ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF kind: ClusterRole apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: tenant:psp rules: - apiGroups: ['policy'] resources: ['podsecuritypolicies'] resourceNames: ['tenant'] verbs: ['use'] EOF ``` And assign it to the tenant ```yaml kubectl apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil namespace: oil-production spec: owners: - kind: User name: alice additionalRoleBindings: - clusterRoleName: tenant:psp subjects: - kind: "Group" apiGroup: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" name: "system:authenticated" EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production ``` As tenant owner, create a pod defining a volume of type `hostpath`. ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: pod-with-hostpath-volume namespace: oil-production spec: containers: - name: busybox image: busybox:latest command: ["/bin/sleep", "3600"] volumeMounts: - mountPath: /tmp name: volume volumes: - name: volume hostPath: # directory location on host path: /data type: Directory EOF ``` You must have the pod blocked by `PodSecurityPolicy`. **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete PodSecurityPolicy tenant kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete ClusterRole tenant:psp ``` ## Block use of host PID **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Behavioral Check **Category:** Host Isolation **Description:** Tenants should not be allowed to share the host process ID (PID) namespace. **Rationale:** The `hostPID` setting allows pods to share the host process ID namespace allowing potential privilege escalation. Tenant pods should not be allowed to share the host PID namespace. **Audit:** As cluster admin, define a `PodSecurityPolicy` that restricts `hostPID` usage and map the policy to a tenant: ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy metadata: name: tenant spec: privileged: false # Required to prevent escalations to root. allowPrivilegeEscalation: false hostPID: false runAsUser: rule: RunAsAny seLinux: rule: RunAsAny supplementalGroups: rule: RunAsAny fsGroup: rule: RunAsAny EOF ``` > Note: make sure `PodSecurityPolicy` Admission Control is enabled on the APIs server: `--enable-admission-plugins=PodSecurityPolicy` Then create a ClusterRole using or granting the said item ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF kind: ClusterRole apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: tenant:psp rules: - apiGroups: ['policy'] resources: ['podsecuritypolicies'] resourceNames: ['tenant'] verbs: ['use'] EOF ``` And assign it to the tenant ```yaml kubectl apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil namespace: oil-production spec: owners: - kind: User name: alice additionalRoleBindings: - clusterRoleName: tenant:psp subjects: - kind: "Group" apiGroup: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" name: "system:authenticated" EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production ``` As tenant owner, create a pod mounting the host PID namespace. ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: pod-with-host-pid namespace: oil-production spec: hostPID: true containers: - name: busybox image: busybox:latest command: ["/bin/sleep", "3600"] EOF ``` You must have the pod blocked by `PodSecurityPolicy`. **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete PodSecurityPolicy tenant kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete ClusterRole tenant:psp ``` ## Block use of NodePort services **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Behavioral Check **Category:** Host Isolation **Description:** Tenants should not be able to create services of type NodePort. **Rationale:** the service type `NodePorts` configures host ports that cannot be secured using Kubernetes network policies and require upstream firewalls. Also, multiple tenants cannot use the same host port numbers. **Audit:** As cluster admin, create a tenant ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil spec: serviceOptions: allowedServices: nodePort: false owners: - kind: User name: alice EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production ``` As tenant owner, creates a service in the tenant namespace having service type of `NodePort` ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: nginx labels: namespace: oil-production spec: ports: - protocol: TCP port: 8080 targetPort: 80 selector: run: nginx type: NodePort EOF ``` You must receive an error message denying the request: ``` Error from server Error from server (NodePort service types are forbidden for the tenant: error when creating "STDIN": admission webhook "services.capsule.clastix.io" denied the request: NodePort service types are forbidden for the tenant: please, reach out to the system administrators ``` **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil ``` ## Configure namespace object limits **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Configuration **Category:** Fairness **Description:** Namespace resource quotas should be used to allocate, track and limit the number of objects, of a particular type, that can be created within a namespace. **Rationale:** Resource quotas must be configured for each tenant namespace, to guarantee isolation and fairness across tenants. **Audit:** As cluster admin, create a tenant ```yaml kubectl create -f - < Note: make sure `PodSecurityPolicy` Admission Control is enabled on the APIs server: `--enable-admission-plugins=PodSecurityPolicy` Then create a ClusterRole using or granting the said item ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF kind: ClusterRole apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: tenant:psp rules: - apiGroups: ['policy'] resources: ['podsecuritypolicies'] resourceNames: ['tenant'] verbs: ['use'] EOF ``` And assign it to the tenant ```yaml kubectl apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil namespace: oil-production spec: owners: - kind: User name: alice additionalRoleBindings: - clusterRoleName: tenant:psp subjects: - kind: "Group" apiGroup: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" name: "system:authenticated" EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production ``` As tenant owner, create a pod defining a volume of any of the core type except `PersistentVolumeClaim`. For example: ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: pod-with-hostpath-volume namespace: oil-production spec: containers: - name: busybox image: busybox:latest command: ["/bin/sleep", "3600"] volumeMounts: - mountPath: /tmp name: volume volumes: - name: volume hostPath: # directory location on host path: /data type: Directory EOF ``` You must have the pod blocked by `PodSecurityPolicy`. **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete PodSecurityPolicy tenant kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete ClusterRole tenant:psp ``` ## Require PV reclaim policy of delete **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Configuration Check **Category:** Data Isolation **Description:** Force a tenant to use a Storage Class with `reclaimPolicy=Delete`. **Rationale:** Tenants have to be assured that their Persistent Volumes cannot be reclaimed by other tenants. **Audit:** As cluster admin, create a Storage Class with `reclaimPolicy=Delete` ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: storage.k8s.io/v1 kind: StorageClass metadata: name: delete-policy reclaimPolicy: Delete provisioner: clastix.io/nfs EOF ``` As cluster admin, create a tenant and assign the above Storage Class ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil spec: owners: - kind: User name: alice storageClasses: allowed: - delete-policy EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production ``` As tenant owner, creates a Persistent Volume Claim in the tenant namespace missing the Storage Class or using any other Storage Class: ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF kind: PersistentVolumeClaim apiVersion: v1 metadata: name: pvc namespace: oil-production spec: accessModes: - ReadWriteOnce resources: requests: storage: 12Gi EOF ``` You must receive an error message denying the request: ``` Error from server (A valid Storage Class must be used, one of the following (delete-policy)): error when creating "STDIN": admission webhook "pvc.capsule.clastix.io" denied the request: A valid Storage Class must be used, one of the following (delete-policy) ``` **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete storageclass delete-policy ``` ## Require run as non-root user **Profile Applicability:** L1 **Type:** Behavioral Check **Category:** Control Plane Isolation **Description:** Control container permissions. **Rationale:** Processes in containers run as the root user (uid 0), by default. To prevent potential compromise of container hosts, specify a least-privileged user ID when building the container image and require that application containers run as non-root users. **Audit:** As cluster admin, define a `PodSecurityPolicy` with `runAsUser=MustRunAsNonRoot` and map the policy to a tenant: ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy metadata: name: tenant spec: privileged: false # Required to prevent escalations to root. allowPrivilegeEscalation: false runAsUser: # Require the container to run without root privileges. rule: MustRunAsNonRoot supplementalGroups: rule: MustRunAs ranges: # Forbid adding the root group. - min: 1 max: 65535 fsGroup: rule: MustRunAs ranges: # Forbid adding the root group. - min: 1 max: 65535 EOF ``` > Note: make sure `PodSecurityPolicy` Admission Control is enabled on the APIs server: `--enable-admission-plugins=PodSecurityPolicy` Then create a ClusterRole using or granting the said item ```yaml kubectl create -f - << EOF kind: ClusterRole apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: tenant:psp rules: - apiGroups: ['policy'] resources: ['podsecuritypolicies'] resourceNames: ['tenant'] verbs: ['use'] EOF ``` And assign it to the tenant ```yaml kubectl apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: capsule.clastix.io/v1beta2 kind: Tenant metadata: name: oil spec: owners: - kind: User name: alice additionalRoleBindings: - clusterRoleName: tenant:psp subjects: - kind: "Group" apiGroup: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io" name: "system:authenticated" EOF ./create-user.sh alice oil ``` As tenant owner, run the following command to create a namespace in the given tenant ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig alice create ns oil-production kubectl --kubeconfig alice config set-context --current --namespace oil-production ``` As tenant owner, create a pod or container that does not set `runAsNonRoot` to `true` in its `securityContext`, and `runAsUser` must not be set to 0. ```yaml kubectl --kubeconfig alice apply -f - << EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: pod-run-as-root namespace: oil-production spec: containers: - name: busybox image: busybox:latest command: ["/bin/sleep", "3600"] EOF ``` You must have the pod blocked by `PodSecurityPolicy`. **Cleanup:** As cluster admin, delete all the created resources ```bash kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete tenant oil kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete PodSecurityPolicy tenant kubectl --kubeconfig cluster-admin delete ClusterRole tenant:psp ```