Files
Bose-SoundTouch/pkg/service/proxy/proxy.go
T
Tobias GesellchenandClaude Opus 4.7 339dc80bf1 feat(proxy): add UnsafeLogCredentialHeaders escape hatch for debugging
The previous commit made credential-header redaction unconditional in
proxy log output, which is the right safety floor for production but
inconvenient for local debugging when a developer wants to inspect
Authorization / Cookie / X-Bose-Token values flowing through the
service.

Add an explicit "I-know-what-I-am-doing" toggle:

* New LoggingProxy.UnsafeLogCredentialHeaders bool field.
* Default off — the redaction floor stays in place.
* Reads the LOG_PROXY_CREDENTIALS env var so a developer can flip it
  on without recompiling, mirroring the existing LOG_PROXY_BODY
  pattern.
* When true, formatHeaders skips both the always-sensitive floor and
  the broader Redact policy, so log lines contain raw header values.

CodeQL's go/clear-text-logging rule continues to be satisfied because
the default code path still redacts; only an explicit opt-in via
configuration produces unredacted output, mirroring how
AllowInsecureUpstreamTLS works.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-10 14:30:55 +02:00

174 lines
5.1 KiB
Go

// Package proxy provides a logging reverse proxy used for speaker traffic debugging.
package proxy
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"net/http"
"net/http/httputil"
"os"
"strings"
)
// alwaysSensitiveHeaders are stripped from log output unconditionally — they
// carry credentials whose plaintext value should never appear in a log line
// regardless of how the LoggingProxy was constructed.
var alwaysSensitiveHeaders = []string{
"Authorization",
"Proxy-Authorization",
"Cookie",
"Set-Cookie",
"X-Api-Key",
"X-Bose-Token",
}
// sensitiveHeaders is kept for backwards compatibility with callers that
// reference it by name; it now mirrors alwaysSensitiveHeaders.
var sensitiveHeaders = alwaysSensitiveHeaders
// LoggingProxy wraps a ReverseProxy to provide instrumentation.
type LoggingProxy struct {
Proxy *httputil.ReverseProxy
Redact bool
LogBody bool
RecordEnabled bool
MaxBodySize int64
Recorder *Recorder
// UnsafeLogCredentialHeaders disables the otherwise-unconditional
// redaction of credential-bearing headers (Authorization, Cookie, …) in
// LogRequest / LogResponse output. This is an explicit
// "I-know-what-I'm-doing" escape hatch for local debugging only — never
// enable it in production. Defaults to false; the env-var
// LOG_PROXY_CREDENTIALS=true flips it on so a developer can opt in
// without recompiling.
UnsafeLogCredentialHeaders bool
}
// NewLoggingProxy creates a lightweight logger for HTTP requests/responses.
func NewLoggingProxy(_ string, redact bool) *LoggingProxy {
// targetURL logic should be handled by the caller or we can parse it here
return &LoggingProxy{
Redact: redact,
LogBody: os.Getenv("LOG_PROXY_BODY") == "true",
UnsafeLogCredentialHeaders: os.Getenv("LOG_PROXY_CREDENTIALS") == "true",
MaxBodySize: 1024 * 10, // 10KB default limit for logging
}
}
// SetRecorder sets the recorder for the proxy.
func (lp *LoggingProxy) SetRecorder(r *Recorder) {
lp.Recorder = r
}
// LogRequest prints an abbreviated request with optional header/body redaction.
func (lp *LoggingProxy) LogRequest(r *http.Request) {
headers := formatHeaders(r.Header, lp.Redact, lp.UnsafeLogCredentialHeaders)
bodyStr := "[HIDDEN]"
if lp.LogBody && shouldLogBody(r.Header.Get("Content-Type")) {
if r.Body != nil {
bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewBuffer(bodyBytes))
if int64(len(bodyBytes)) > lp.MaxBodySize {
bodyStr = string(bodyBytes[:lp.MaxBodySize]) + "... [TRUNCATED]"
} else {
bodyStr = string(bodyBytes)
}
} else {
bodyStr = "[EMPTY]"
}
}
log.Printf("[PROXY_REQ] %s %s\n Headers:\n%s\n Body: %s", r.Method, r.URL.String(), headers, bodyStr)
}
// LogResponse prints an abbreviated response with optional header/body redaction.
func (lp *LoggingProxy) LogResponse(r *http.Response) {
headers := formatHeaders(r.Header, lp.Redact, lp.UnsafeLogCredentialHeaders)
bodyStr := "[HIDDEN]"
if lp.LogBody && shouldLogBody(r.Header.Get("Content-Type")) {
if r.Body != nil {
bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewBuffer(bodyBytes))
if int64(len(bodyBytes)) > lp.MaxBodySize {
bodyStr = string(bodyBytes[:lp.MaxBodySize]) + "... [TRUNCATED]"
} else {
bodyStr = string(bodyBytes)
}
} else {
bodyStr = "[EMPTY]"
}
}
log.Printf("[PROXY_RES] %d %s\n Headers:\n%s\n Body: %s", r.StatusCode, r.Request.URL.String(), headers, bodyStr)
if lp.Recorder != nil && lp.RecordEnabled {
_ = lp.Recorder.Record("upstream", r.Request, r)
}
}
func formatHeaders(h http.Header, redact, unsafeLogCredentials bool) string {
var sb strings.Builder
// In Go, http.Header is a map[string][]string.
// Iterating over the map directly allows us to see the actual keys
// stored in the map, which might not be canonical if set directly.
for k, vv := range h {
val := strings.Join(vv, ", ")
// Credentials (Authorization, Cookie, …) are redacted by default.
// unsafeLogCredentials lifts that floor entirely — explicit opt-in
// for local debugging only. When the floor is in place, the
// caller's broader Redact toggle adds further coverage.
switch {
case unsafeLogCredentials:
// No redaction.
case isAlwaysSensitive(k):
val = "[REDACTED]"
case redact && isSensitive(k):
val = "[REDACTED]"
}
fmt.Fprintf(&sb, " %s: %s\n", k, val)
}
return strings.TrimSuffix(sb.String(), "\n")
}
// isAlwaysSensitive returns true for credential-bearing headers that must
// never appear unredacted in logs regardless of caller configuration.
func isAlwaysSensitive(header string) bool {
for _, h := range alwaysSensitiveHeaders {
if strings.EqualFold(h, header) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func isSensitive(header string) bool {
for _, h := range sensitiveHeaders {
if strings.EqualFold(h, header) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func shouldLogBody(contentType string) bool {
contentType = strings.ToLower(contentType)
return strings.Contains(contentType, "xml") ||
strings.Contains(contentType, "json") ||
strings.Contains(contentType, "text") ||
contentType == ""
}