The previous commit made credential-header redaction unconditional in
proxy log output, which is the right safety floor for production but
inconvenient for local debugging when a developer wants to inspect
Authorization / Cookie / X-Bose-Token values flowing through the
service.
Add an explicit "I-know-what-I-am-doing" toggle:
* New LoggingProxy.UnsafeLogCredentialHeaders bool field.
* Default off — the redaction floor stays in place.
* Reads the LOG_PROXY_CREDENTIALS env var so a developer can flip it
on without recompiling, mirroring the existing LOG_PROXY_BODY
pattern.
* When true, formatHeaders skips both the always-sensitive floor and
the broader Redact policy, so log lines contain raw header values.
CodeQL's go/clear-text-logging rule continues to be satisfied because
the default code path still redacts; only an explicit opt-in via
configuration produces unredacted output, mirroring how
AllowInsecureUpstreamTLS works.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CodeQL alert #43 (go/clear-text-logging) flagged that headers flow to
log.Printf in pkg/service/proxy/proxy.go. The existing implementation
only redacted when LoggingProxy.Redact was true — an opt-in. CodeQL is
right to flag this: the safety floor for credential-bearing headers
should not depend on caller configuration.
Split the sensitive-header list into two:
* alwaysSensitiveHeaders — Authorization, Proxy-Authorization, Cookie,
Set-Cookie, X-Api-Key, X-Bose-Token. Redacted unconditionally,
regardless of LoggingProxy.Redact.
* sensitiveHeaders — kept as a compatibility alias pointing at the same
list, and still gated on Redact for any future use cases that want
*additional* opt-in redaction beyond the floor.
Behaviour change is strict tightening: nothing that was previously
hidden becomes visible, and credentials that would have been logged
when Redact was false are now hidden by default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tobias GesellchenandClaude Opus 4.7