When a speaker resolves the firmware-hardcoded content.api.bose.io through
the operator's own DNS instead of AfterTouch, TuneIn/BMX content requests
escape AfterTouch and fail (CURL 60, or a dead-cloud 404), so the speaker
reports INVALID_SOURCE. The existing dns_sanity check only probes AfterTouch's
own answering side over loopback, so it passes even when no speaker uses
AfterTouch as its resolver. This adds a speaker-side, on-demand check.
dns_speaker_usage:
- pkg/discovery/dns.go tracks distinct non-loopback clients that query an
intercepted Bose hostname (interceptClients set, populated in recordQuery,
exposed via InterceptClientIPs()). Loopback is excluded so dns_sanity's own
probes don't register.
- The check lists each unconfirmed speaker as an info finding with a "Test DNS
path" quick-fix. It never emits a standing warning, so it does not
false-positive after a restart (the querier set is in-memory and starts empty).
Active probe (the "Test DNS path" quick-fix; also POST /setup/health/dns-path-probe):
- Sends a /speaker notification carrying a per-probe nonce as the app_key. To
accept it the speaker must resolve audionotification.api.bosecm.com
(intercepted) and call back GET /v1/auth with that nonce; the callback
arriving is direct proof the speaker resolves Bose hosts through AfterTouch.
- HandleSpeakerAuth returns 403 for a matching nonce so the speaker refuses the
notification (silent, no audio, confirmed on hardware); any other key still
gets 200 so real TTS is untouched. Reuses resolveTTSHost for SSRF-safe
targeting; the nonce is never logged. Registered without refresh so the probe
result stays visible in the Health tab.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The speaker firmware constructs the OAuth host by appending "oauth" to
the first label of the configured streaming hostname (aftertouch.lan
→ aftertouchoauth.lan, used by both Spotify and Amazon Music token
refresh). AfterTouch's DNS server previously only hijacked the
hardcoded list of Bose hostnames, so operators self-hosting at a
custom hostname had to add the OAuth alias themselves — and the
amazon-music-oauth.md / spotify-overview.md docs incorrectly
claimed the DNS server handled it automatically.
ofthesun9 (#337) caught this via the worst variant: IP-based
serverURL (192.168.0.30 → 192oauth.168.0.30), which is a malformed
hostname no DNS resolver can answer for. There is no clean DNS
workaround for the IP case — the operator must use a hostname.
Three changes:
- pkg/discovery/dns.go DeriveOAuthHostnames parses the configured
serverURL, derives <first-label>oauth.<rest> when the host is a
hostname (not IP), and adds it to the DNSDiscovery hijack list. IP
serverURLs deliberately yield no derivation — the malformed name
isn't worth handling and the new health check surfaces the trap.
- New checks_oauth_target health check fires a Warning when serverURL
is an IP literal, with a concrete example of the malformed name
(`192oauth.168.0.30`) and a ManualCommand pointing at the switch.
- amazon-music-oauth.md and spotify-overview.md rewritten: drop the
false "automatic" claim, document the three resolution paths
(AfterTouch DNS + speaker resolves via it / external LAN DNS /
per-speaker /etc/hosts), and explicitly flag IP-based --server-url
as incompatible with OAuth on either provider.
Tests cover the derivation matrix (hostname / IPv4 / IPv6 / single
label / empty / garbage URL), shouldIntercept's new behaviour
(derived host hit, base host not auto-hijacked, case-insensitive),
the health check's four states, and the malformed-host helper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mirrors the .md/.txt sweep across all tracked _test.go, testdata XML,
and .http integration files. Test files are self-contained (producer
+ assertion in the same file), so the matched-pair swap stays green
under `go test ./...`.
Mapping applied:
192.168.178.[0-9]+ → 192.0.2.[same]
192.168.1.[0-9]+ → 192.0.2.[same]
Sound Machinechen → Living Room SoundTouch
A Sound Machine → Kitchen SoundTouch
A81B6A536A98 + case/separator variants → AABBCCDDEEFF (etc.)
A81B6A849D99 → AABBCCDDEE01
A81B6A849D88 → AABBCCDDEE03
A81B6A536A09 → AABBCCDDEE04
884AEAEEBD27 → AABBCCDDEE02
3230304 → 1000001
9569497 → 1000002
Two semantic fixes alongside the bulk swap:
- pkg/service/zeroconf/zeroconf_test.go: the "private 192" and
"strips query" cases pin acceptance of RFC-1918 192.168/16. They
must use a real 192.168 value; doc-range IPs would (correctly) be
rejected by validateZcBaseURL. Switched to 192.168.10.10 — generic
enough not to match any home LAN default, real enough for the
validator. Added a comment explaining why this single test still
carries a 192.168 literal.
- pkg/service/setup/setup_test.go: TestTestDNSRedirection mocks the
device's `od -An -tu1` byte output, which is space-separated
octets ("192 168 1 100"). My sed only matched the dot-separated
form, so the mock was returning the old IP while the test
assertions had moved to the doc range. Updated to " 192 0 2 100".
go build ./... clean. go test ./... clean (only TestDocsConsistency
remains failing, which is a pre-existing/untracked-file issue).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reduces `pkg/discovery` test suite runtime by ~75% (from ~17s to ~4s) by eliminating unnecessary network timeouts and reducing wait intervals.
- Refactor `discovery.Service` to use an injectable `http.Client`, allowing UPnP enrichment tests to use `httptest.Server` instead of waiting for 5s network timeouts.
- Make `DNSDiscovery` forward timeout configurable and reduce it from 2s to 100ms in unit tests.
- Decrease discovery and context timeouts in mDNS and Unified discovery tests to the minimum required for stable verification (typically 100-200ms).
Tobias GesellchenandClaude Opus 4.8